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The Army Seeks a World Class Logistics 
Modernization Program 
William Lucyshyn — Visiting Senior Research Scholar, Center for Public Policy and Private 
Enterprise, University of Maryland 
Keith F. Snider — Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Robert Maly — Graduate Research Assistant, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, 
University of Maryland1 
On a hot summer day in early August 1999, Paul Capelli walked from the 
Longworth House of Representatives office building after briefing the staffers of 
Representative Richard Gephardt on the Army program for which he was responsible.  
He was on his way to brief another House member and his staffers in the Rayburn office 
building.  This trip felt like his 100th, and he wondered if they would ever stop.  Capelli 
had been tasked by the Army Materiel Command (AMC) to lead a project team to 
modernize the Army’s logistics management and information systems in the Logistics 
Modernization Program (LMP).2 
In the beginning, Paul Capelli was concerned mainly with assembling the right 
team and developing innovative alternatives for modernization.  However, he had soon 
realized his major resistance would come due to the unprecedented nature of the 
modernization, and the political resistance that resulted. 
                                                 
1 This case was a joint effort of the University of Maryland’s Center for Public Policy and Private 
Enterprise (at the School of Public Policy) and the Naval Post Graduate School’s Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy.  William Lucyshyn is Visiting Senior Research Scholar at the Center for 
Public Policy and Private Enterprise, Keith F. Snider is an Associate Professor at the Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy (Naval Post Graduate School), and Robert Maly is Graduate Research 
Assistant at the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise.  This case was written under the 
supervision of Professor Jacques S. Gansler at the University of Maryland and was supported by RADM 
James B. Greene, USN (Ret) Acquisition Chair at the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
(Naval Post Graduate School) 
2 Originally, LMP, or LogMod, was termed “WLMP,” which referred to Wholesale LMP. Later, LMP was 
expanded to include retail logistics and the “W” was dropped from LMP, although the wholesale and retail 
operations have yet to be integrated fully as of April 2004. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Capelli’s work with LMP started two years prior in August of 1997 at the 
Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. 
CECOM’s Deputy to the Commanding General Mr. Victor Ferlise called Capelli to ask 
him if he’d be interested in leading an important new program that would help 
modernize the Army’s outdated logistics management systems.  Capelli had served at 
every level within CECOM’s Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) prior to being named the 
Program Director of LMP.  And, since a core aspect of LMP was the modernization of 
the logistics business processes, Capelli’s experience made him a logical choice.   
CECOM was responding to an Army Materiel Command’s (AMC’s) August 5, 
1997 memorandum (see Appendix A), in which AMC’s Deputy Commanding General 
Dennis Benchoff tasked the Commander, CECOM “to explore alternatives to modernize 
the wholesale logistics processes and associated information technology to support 
these processes.”3   Specifically, the letter asked CECOM to:4 
a. Determine feasible alternatives for logistics modernization strategies,  
b. consider the implications and devise methods to soften the impact on the 
existing workforce, 
c. develop a performance-based statement of requirements, and 
d. to recommend an acquisition approach.  
As the first step toward this aim, General Benchoff had asked the CECOM 
Commander to designate a Special Project Team in order to gather information and 
conduct market research to develop alternatives for a modernization strategy.  The 
team, to be led by Capelli, would ultimately consist of top hand-picked individuals from 
across AMC, all of AMC’s Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs), one of which is 
CECOM; numerous affiliated MSC depots; and other activities and centers supporting 
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the Army’s logistics enterprise. Specifically, Benchoff wanted the team to develop a plan 
to modernize the Army’s wholesale logistics systems leveraging recent acquisition 
reform initiatives and best commercial business processes and products.  He 
encouraged outside-the-box thinking and gave the team the authority to challenge all 
regulatory and process constraints. Benchoff envisioned a “partnering with industry” that 
“privatized development and sustainment of the wholesale logistics automation 
systems.”5 
PAUL CAPELLI 
Before he became the Program Director for LMP, Capelli served in the federal 
government for over 20 years.  He began his career in logistics at CECOM and steadily 
developed into one of CECOM’s most talented leaders.  Throughout his tenure there, 
Capelli had been a user of the logistics systems as well as a supervisor for divisions of 
other users.  In fact, he had experience with virtually every aspect of CECOM’s logistics 
processes during his career—as an intern, a materiel manager, a branch chief and a 
division chief. 
Prior to his appointment with LMP, Capelli was the Deputy Director in CECOM’s 
Directorate of Materiel Management, where he began seeing the changes in strategic 
direction the Army was making.  Increasingly, the Army’s strategy was integrating best 
practices from the commercial sector.  In this capacity, Capelli began to believe that the 
Army’s supply chain processes could benefit greatly from those in the private sector 
where firms were continually making their world class systems more effective and more 
efficient. 
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SETTING THE STAGE 
The US Army is supported by a vast and complex logistics network, which 
contains about $9 billion of Army general issue inventory and about $4 billion in spare 
parts; the average annual inventory turnover is about $2.5 billion.6  It is this system that 
is responsible for moving supplies from manufacturers and warehouses to the soldiers 
on the battleground.  
The first Gulf War revealed flaws in the existing Army logistics system.  These 
weaknesses were generally not characterized by a lack of supplies, but by a lack of 
supplies in a timely manner, and the inability to efficiently get supplies, replacement 
parts and equipment to the units that needed them.7  In fact, the Gulf War logistics 
operation has often been described as a classic “push” system in which the Army would 
literally send everything it might need into the theater first, and then issue the specific 
equipment as needed.  This method can be effective, but it is rarely efficient.  Generals 
coming off helicopters after the war referred to the pallets of unused equipment in the 
desert as “iron mountains.”  Recognizing a need for improvement, Department of 
Defense (DoD) and Army leaders began to look to the advances made in how the  
private sector was transforming supply chain management and began to consider ways 
to incorporate those into their logistics reform efforts.  
In fact, the 1990’s saw a large push throughout the entire federal government for 
best business practices.  In Congress, the Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993 set off a series of mandates for government performance measurements, 
infrastructure reductions and increased government efficiency within the federal 
government known as the Revolution in Business Affairs.  In parallel, DoD introduced its 
Revolution in Military Affairs based on the idea that the US military must revolutionize 
                                                 
6 Paul Taibl, “Army Logistics Modernization Program: A Case Study,” Business Executives for National 
Security Tail-to-Tooth, April 9, 1999. [Accessed on February 2004]  Viewed at http://www.bens.org. 
7 Larry Asch, LMP Chief, LMP Business Office, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly 
and Keith Snider.  College Park, Maryland, January 29, 2004. 
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itself in order to adapt to future needs of speed and flexibility in combat.  In 1994, 
President Clinton signed the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, and in 1996, he 
signed the Federal Acquisition Reform Act.  These laws made it easier for the 
government to buy goods and services from the private sector through reduced 
government oversight, simplified contracting procedures, and generally eliminated 
barriers between the public and private sectors.8 
In July 1996, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Joint Vision 2010, which proposed a 
vision for the US military to channel human resources and leverage technological 
advances to achieve higher levels of effectiveness and efficiency.  It identified four main 
operational cornerstones—among them, focused logistics that were responsive, flexible 
and precise.  The report stated: “Service and Defense agencies will work jointly and 
integrate with the civilian sector, where required, to take advantage of advanced 
business practices, commercial economies, and global networks.”9 
Two of the most influential legislative actions in the 1990s regarding acquisition 
reform, the Governmental Performance and Results Act (1993) and the Clinger Cohen 
Act (1996), stressed the importance of government performing duties that were 
inherently governmental.  These Acts recommended that non-core competencies, those 
duties such as software maintenance that could be performed in the private sector, 
should be competitively sourced. 
In May 1997, Defense Secretary William Cohen released the Quadrennial 
Defense Review which mandated the adoption of innovative business practices used in 
the private sector and put forward goals to reengineer DoD support structures.  
Secretary Cohen said, “Our purchasing system is still too cumbersome, slow and 
                                                 
8 Michael Lippitz, Sean O'Keefe and John White with John Brown, “Advancing the Revolution in Business 
Affairs,” Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future, Cambridge, MA: Preventive Defense 
Project, September 2000, p. 170-171. [Accessed on April 2004]  Viewed at 
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/KTE_ch7.pdf.. 
9 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, 1996, p. 24. 
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expensive.  We still do too many things in-house that we can do better and cheaper 
through outsourcing.”10 
And yet, as of August of 1997, the Army still relied on its 30-year-old logistics and 
depot maintenance systems, the Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS) and 
the Standard Depot System (SDS), to support the Army’s annual procurement of 
supplies and equipment worth billions of dollars.  These wholesale systems, which were 
written in Common Business Oriented Language (COBOL) software dated from the 
early 1970’s, were neither flexible nor adaptable to change, and were very expensive to 
sustain and upgrade.11  In addition, when the Army questioned whether developing and 
maintaining these computer systems was a core competency, the answer came back a 
resounding no. 
According to Paul Capelli, “While commercial logistics business processes have 
evolved towards replacing inventory mass with velocity management, the Army logistics 
system remains based upon an inventory mass concept…For the soldier, the current 
system is inflexible and generally unresponsive.  For the Army, it is obsolete and costly 
to sustain. Modernization of our thirty-year-old system is an imperative.”12 
                                                 
10 William Cohen, DoD News Release, May 5, 1997. [Accessed on April 2004]  Viewed at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May1997/b051997_bt250-97.html. 
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SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY TO MODERNIZE 
In 1996, as a result of a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
recommendation, CECOM assumed responsibility for the two Army central design 
activity (CDA) logistics centers in St. Louis, Missouri, and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.  
Previously under the authority of the Industrial Operations Command, the mission of 
these centers had been to “design, develop and maintain computer software systems 
and provide services that manage commodities, such as ammunition, avionics, 
communications and electronics, tanks, and missiles.”13 
One of CECOM’s first actions at these centers was to assess the state of the 
logistics systems run at each location.  At the time, many COBOL software experts were 
retiring—in fact, most would be eligible for retirement in less than two years.14  As a 
result, CECOM managers were finding it difficult to train new employees in COBOL—
both because there were fewer and fewer people to be the trainers and because the 
technology was so old, with little application in the private sector, so recruiting new 
employees was difficult.  From their evaluation of the current systems, CCSS and SDS, 
both based on outmoded business processes and outdated technology, CECOM 
determined that addressing the outdated systems was a top priority.  Larry Asch, Chief 
of the Business and Operations Office at LMP, said, “The systems were being held 
together with spaghetti links.”15 
According to CECOM, there were major weaknesses in the old AMC legacy 
systems:16  
                                                 
13 General Accounting Office, “DoD Competitive Sourcing: Plan Needed to Mitigate Risks in Army 
Logistics Modernization Program,” October 1999, p. 5. 
14 LMP Special Project Team, “The Business Case: Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” 
CECOM, US Army, February 12, 2004, p. 13. 
15 Larry Asch, LMP Chief, LMP Business Office, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly 
and Keith Snider.  College Park, Maryland, January 29, 2004. 
16 LMP Special Project Team, “The Business Case: Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” 
CECOM, US Army, February 12, 2004, p. 7. 
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· Lack of flexibility: Process changes, regulatory changes, and reorganizations within 
and between user commands require expensive and extensive data conversions 
and programming changes. 
· Slow, unfocused reports: Reporting and summarization capabilities are geared to 
workers. Managers and executives, with their need for easily specified, flexible, 
tailored, and rapid generation of reports and summaries are usually frustrated with 
output capabilities. 
· Difficult to use: The system is not user friendly.  The system relies on extensive use 
of codes to provide compact storage (a holdover from the time when computer 
storage was inordinately expensive).  Users are required to learn codes and have 
extensive system knowledge. The system lacks adequate data edits and validations, 
as well as support functions. 
· Expensive to maintain: The system’s size and complexities make it difficult to 
manage and change code.  Large portions are based on relatively old third-
generation programming languages and flat data structures that are inflexible to 
change and inefficient to operate. 
· Unresponsive: The use of batch processing precludes timely updates to data 
architecture, flexible data retrieval capabilities, and informed decision-making. 
· Outmoded database: The use of outmoded database systems and architecture 
result in rampant data inconsistencies, data duplication, and the lack of data 
standardization. 
· Expensive to operate: The system requires extensive manual intervention because 
of outmoded data and system architectures. 
· Lack of cost-sharing: The Army is the only “bill payer,” precluding the ability to 
leverage existing industry investments in modern logistics processes and IT. 
Said one Army logistics consultant: “The trust in the system is not there.  
Because supply lines are slow and unreliable, the smart supply clerk orders twice as 
much as he needs, or he orders it again 30 days later, just to be sure it comes in.”17  
According to Larry Asch, the existing system was characterized by the mantra: “gotta’ 
                                                 
17 Nancy Ferris, “Logistics Logjam,” Government Executive, May 1, 1999. [Accessed on February 2004]  
Viewed at http://www.govexec.com. 
 
Acquisition Research 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY   - 9- 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
hunch, buy a bunch.”18  Yet another observer said of the CCSS and SDS systems: 
“These old systems are literally running on patches and prayers and could collapse at 
any time.”19  The resultant excess inventory from these systems costs the Army millions 
of dollars. 
Now that CECOM was able to examine the situation with a new and independent 
perspective, the necessity for modernization was painfully obvious.  Yet, due to 
institutional resistance and inertia, the status quo had been sustained for years.  The 
transition of the CDA centers from AMC’s Industrial Operations Command to CECOM 
provided an opportunity for change and innovation. From the first days of this transition, 
CECOM proceeded with a proactive approach. 
In the CECOM tasking letter, General Benchoff made clear that the 
modernization goal was an imperative, but the direction for modernization was left wide 
open because the solution was yet unknown.  The tasking included four broad 
parameters.  First, the letter emphasized that maximizing the logistics performance to 
supply the troops was AMC’s core competency—software coding was not.   Second, 
Benchoff determined that the team must seek a solution that operated within the current 
operating budget, that is, the existing system had to maintained as the new one was 
developed—all within the current operating budget, estimated at $426M for the next 10 
years.  He did not want to go to Congress and ask for more money to fund the 
modernization because he was not confident in the result, and he knew, at minimum, 
doing so would greatly slow down the process.  Third, Benchoff believed it was 
important to use best commercial business processes and technology because the 
private sector was so far ahead of the public sector in supply chain management 
practices.  Finally, Benchoff instructed Capelli to take care of the employees at the CDA 
                                                 
18 Larry Asch, LMP Chief, LMP Business Office, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly 
and Keith Snider.  College Park, Maryland, January 29, 2004. 
19 Paul Taibl, “Army Logistics Modernization Program: A Case Study,” Business Executives for National 
Security Tail-to-Tooth, April 9, 1999. [Accessed on February 2004]  Viewed at http://www.bens.org.  
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centers who had given many years of committed work, had done their jobs well, and 
who would be ultimately most affected by the modernization changes. 
With these broad parameters, AMC gave Capelli’s team the modernization task 
and essentially said, “Now go figure out how to do this.” 
Within a week of assuming the responsibility to direct the new logistics 
modernization program, Paul knew that the staffing of the special project team was his 
first important responsibility as the team leader.  Finding themselves in uncharted 
territory, Paul and one of his key attorneys, Thomas Carroll, decided they needed 
expertise in key areas of contracting, logistics and IT.  Fortunately, Paul’s supervisor, 
Victor Ferlise, was an avid supporter of the program.  Ferlise essentially told Capelli: 
“Get the best and the brightest people—give me specific names you need, and we’ll get 
them.”20  Paul and Thomas made a list of their nominees, emphasizing highly 
knowledgeable people who were innovators and risk-takers. 
Said Paul Capelli: “My initial concerns were focused around getting the right 
people together.  Fortunately, this consideration was a core element for my 
management as well. We got the best and the brightest that CECOM had to offer, and 
then when the contract was eventually awarded, we got the best and the brightest of 
what the AMC community had to offer.”21  
Thomas Carroll said: “Vic Ferlise went to the Commander and said, ‘We want 
this guy and this guy.’  And of course we were asking for the best of the best, so 
everyone objected.  But our task was such a priority that our leaders mandated the 
personnel choices.  That’s how we got the team we needed.”22 
                                                 
20 Larry Asch, LMP Chief, LMP Business Office, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly 
and Keith Snider.  College Park, Maryland, January 29, 2004. 
21 Paul Capelli, email response to questions, May 14, 2004 
22 Thomas Carroll, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
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By the Spring of 1998, Capelli had 7 new people on his team that represented 
some of the most experienced CECOM staff.  Many team members had over 20 years 
experience with major contracts and complicated programs.  In all, the team had over 
100 years of acquisition experience.23 With such a talented roster, AMC leadership 
empowered the team to freely seek modernization solutions without unnecessary 
oversight and restrictions.  The team was required to directly coordinate with only one of 
their superiors, Victor Ferlise, the Deputy to the Commander of CECOM. 
Once they took a closer look at the challenges facing them, for Capelli and his 
team, the path ahead was clear: 
“It is time, once again, for the Army’s wholesale logistics business systems to lay 
claim to the title of state of the art by adopting commercially available business 
processes and enabling technologies.  A refinement of our systems is not enough.  We 
can only achieve a revolution in military logistics if we first revolutionize our business 
affairs.  The destination is known.  It is a place where American industry resides; 
successfully forged out of competition in a global marketplace during the 80s and 90s.”24 
In order to accomplish their first task, developing feasible alternatives for logistics 
modernization, the team began work on a business case. 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Paul Capelli and John Keogh, “Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” LMP, US Army, p. 1. 
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ALTERNATIVES: HOW TO MODERNIZE? 
First, the team began to conduct market research to see where the best private 
sector firms were regarding supply chain processes.  The team decided early in the 
process that free and open communication with the private sector was critical to their 
success.  While  they had their top-level goal of modernization, they did not have a 
template of how to achieve that goal.  Said Carroll, “At every step, we were more open 
with industry about what we were doing, and why we were doing it than anyone has 
ever been in a government procurement, in my experience.”25  So, the team conducted 
meetings for 6-8 months with industry leaders to find out what lessons learned and best 
practices companies had discovered from their own modernization efforts.  The team 
also developed a website that enabled companies and prospective service vendors to 
ask questions about the LMP project and enter into a dialogue with the project team. 
As a result of their research and communication with industry, the team realized 
their modernization goal was essentially dual in nature: (1) to reengineer their business 
processes, and (2) to support those new processes with modern information 
technology.26  With this goal and the original parameters in mind, the LMP team used 
the following as screening criteria for potential alternatives:27 
· Wholesale logistics must change to meet the needs of the modern Army. 
· The potential performing organization must have the expertise to perform Business 
Process Reengineering (BPR) and the experience to implement logistics 
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software. 
· The alternatives must have an acceptable level of risk and risk mitigation strategy. 
                                                 
25 Thomas Carroll, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
26 Ibid. 
27 LMP Special Project Team, “The Business Case: Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” 
CECOM, US Army, February 12, 2004, p. 11. 
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· Alternatives must have the potential to meet the schedule for developing and fielding 
the Army Global Combat Support System (GCSS-Army is a strategy to modernize 
and implement an integrated logistics system that meets the requirements of the 21st 
century).  
· Alternatives must have the potential to be executable within the existing operating 
budget. 
Based on the screening criteria, the status quo was rejected as a viable option, 
which reconfirmed the commitment to bring about the needed changes.  In the Business 
Case study, the LMP team identified three alternatives to the status quo.28 
Alternative 1: 
The CDAs perform legacy sustainment while minimizing changes to existing 
systems.  The Government also performs wholesale logistics modernization.  This in-
house effort employs the current workforce to implement a modern enterprise project 
with COTS software.  This alternative assumes that the CDAs will be reorganized, 
provided the skills and trained to perform industry-quality BPR.  Additionally, they will 
acquire the skills to design and implement a system that will achieve the modernization 
and sustainment goals of the LMP and GCSS-Army. 
Alternative 2:  
The Government performs legacy sustainment; the contractor performs 
wholesale logistics modernization and sustainment of the modernized system.  
Alternative 2 relies on the private sector for modernization while the Army continues to 
maintain its legacy system. 
                                                 
28 Ibid, 11-12. 
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Alternative 3:   
The Contractor performs legacy sustainment services and wholesale logistics 
modernization services.  The contractor will employ displaced Central Design Activities 
center workers.   
Under Alternative 1, federal IT employees would be responsible for the 
modernization, yet the majority of these employees had neither the expertise nor the 
basic skills necessary for such a transformation.  A 1997 General Accounting Office 
(GAO) report said that when federal employees attempt to  undertake a software 
modernization such as the LMP, the result often “is characterized by a software process 
that is ad hoc, and occasionally even chaotic.”29  In addition to lacking the basic software 
and programming skills, existing federal employees lacked critical BPR knowledge and 
experience that was needed for the logistics modernization.  On top of the performance 
risk that these deficiencies posed, re-training the federal employees would pose time 
and financial risks.  The Business Case estimated the cost of Alternative 1 at $581.7M 
for the next 10 years, which would exceed the current operating budget by at least 30 
percent; and even if the federal employees were able to reengineer the logistic process 
and modernize the system, the LMP team estimated a delay of at least four years (see 
Figure 1 for Investment/Implementation Comparison of the three Alternatives). 
Under Alternative 2, perhaps the biggest risk to the LMP was the conversion from 
the legacy system to the modernized system.  Using this alternative, there would likely 
be an adversarial relationship between the government employees and the contractor 
because as the modernization was implemented, the contractor would be increasingly 
displacing government employees.  In fact, there was an inverse incentive for 
government employees to work inefficiently toward the program goals so that their 
employment could be extended.  Furthermore, the actual conversion of data from the 
legacy system to the new system would be at risk. The Business Case noted:  
                                                 
29 General Accounting Office, “Defense Computers: LSSC Needs to Confront Significant Year 2000 
Issues,” September 1997, p. 9-10. 
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When the legacy system and a modernized system are separated, and their 
respective responsibilities for each system is separated between the government 
and the contractor, the risk inherent in the data migration is magnified since each 
organization has little expertise in the other’s systems and processes.30 
Although the estimated cost of Alternative 2 was $425.2M for a ten year period, 
which was below the current operating budget, the risks were such that Army officials 
feared the estimate could quickly balloon. 
Also, under Alternative 2, there would be no provision for a “soft-landing” for the 
then 478 government employees at the two Central Design Activities centers in St. 
Louis and Chambersburg.31  Under alternative 3, the soft-landing was an arrangement in 
which the winning contractor would agree to employ the government employees 
affected by the transition for a pre-specified period of time, offering competitive pay and 
benefits.  Consideration of the employees at the CDA centers had been one of the 
original mandates for the project team.  Moreover, without a soft-landing provision, 
Army officials feared the federal employees, who had the most expertise in sustaining 
the legacy system until modernization was fully implemented, would leave before the 
transition took place.  One solution to this specific concern would be to migrate the 
systems in a “turn key” fashion—turning on the modernized system all at once while 
turning off the legacy system.  However, the Joint Logistics Systems Center had tried 
this approach in a similar effort in 1998 with little success.  The LMP team determined a 
phased approach, with incremental transitions between the systems, was preferred. 
The project team strongly recommended Alternative 3 with a ten year program 
cost of $420.9.  The project team determined that the biggest risk posed by Alternative 
3 was the interruption of logistics services during the transition from the government to 
the contractor.  However, since the status quo had already been rejected, this 
alternative appeared the least risky of the three.  Essentially, the team determined the 
                                                 
30 LMP Special Project Team, “The Business Case: Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” 
CECOM, US Army, February 12, 2004, p. 24. 
31 General Accounting Office, “DoD Competitive Sourcing: Plan Needed to Mitigate Risks in Army 
Logistics Modernization Program,” October 1999, p. 7. 
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greatest risk was doing nothing.  Private industry, with companies such as Federal 
Express, Chrysler and Proctor and Gamble, had proven its ability to continuously 
integrate new technology and reengineer business processes to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness.  This alternative would allow the modernization to occur under current 
Army funding levels, as directed, because the winning contractor would be required to 
provide the initial investment costs.  
 
Figure 1 
Source: LMP Business Case, 1999 
In the end, the project team determined Alternative 3 would best satisfy LMP 
goals and objectives.  This alternative, utilizing commercial best practices and proven 
experience, had the lowest estimated cost for the government (see Table 1), the lowest 
level of risk, and the best prospect for a timely transition.  In addition, it was the only 
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 Baseline Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 
Current 
Dollars 
$426.0M $581.7M $425.2M $420.9M 
Table 1.  Cost summary of Alternatives (10 Year program)   
Source: LMP Business Case, 1999 
Said Capelli: “If you look at any of the other alternatives, the people impacts are 
much more severe…I personally believe that many of [the employees] will be better off 
[under LMP].”32 
Under this alternative, the Army would neither own nor operate the new system.  
According to Victor Ferlise, “We made a fundamental switch from the procurement of 
systems to the acquisition of services.”33  The contractor that the Army selects would be 
responsible for re-engineering and modernizing the service’s logistics processes using 
commercial best practices on a continual basis—thereby satisfying the team’s two-fold 
goal.  “We didn’t want to worry about obsolescence every couple years,” said Asch.34 
                                                 
32 Nancy Ferris, “Logistics Logjam,” Government Executive, May 1, 1999. [Accessed on February 2004]  
Viewed at http://www.govexec.com. 
33 Victor Ferlise, “Innovations in Logistics Modernization,” Program Manager, May/June 2000, p. 64. 
34 Dan Caterinicchia, “Army Logistics Marches Ahead,” Federal Computer Weekly, November 18, 2002. 
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COMPARING APPLES TO ORANGES:  
OUTSOURCING OR PRIVATIZATION 
Once it settled on Alternative 3, the project team considered how their 
modernization effort would need to use the relevant government processes for acquiring 
private sector services.  The team believed they would need to conduct either an 
outsourcing or privatization effort. 
All outsourcing proposals were required to comply with the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 requirements; that is, to use “competitive sourcing” 
(i.e. competition between the public and private sector to do the work).  A-76 requires all 
federal agencies pursuing competitive sourcing options to allow the federal employees 
to form a “most efficient organization” (MEO) in order to compete on equal footing with 
the private companies for a contract.  While outsourcing is the sourcing model in which 
organizational activities are contracted out to vendors or suppliers who specialize in 
these activities in a competitive fashion.35  However, the LMP project team believed its 
objectives required privatization, not outsourcing.  In contrast to outsourcing, 
privatization is the sourcing model in which current government equipment and 
personnel are moved into the private sector.36  First, the team maintained that it did not 
make sense to conduct a cost comparison competition under A-76 because the current 
CDA employees were not comparable to the BPR and IT experts in the private sector 
with which they would be competing.  “It was like comparing apples to oranges,” said 
Carroll.37  Secondly, in an A-76 competition, when the government MEO loses, the 
employees lose their jobs completely.  From their market research and the business 
case, the team knew the CDA employees had no chance to compete through the A-76 
                                                 
35 Jacques Gansler, Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of Government as 
the Provider, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise and the IBM Endowment for the Business of 
Government, June 2003, p. 10. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Thomas Carroll, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
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process with the private sector because they simply did not possess the necessary 
expertise.  Privatization was consistent with their desire for a soft-landing provision with 
the winning contractor.  Consequently, privatization was deemed the way to go. 
The team decided to work towards a strategic partnership with one contractor for 
a 10-year period.  However, the team’s research led them to decide that their first 
priority would be to find the best company, not necessarily the best software solution 
initially. They determined: 
…no ‘silver bullet’ solution [was] available that satisf[ied] all the Army’s 
anticipated needs. Rather several commercial software products provide the 
functionality to accomplish the wholesale logistics requirements.  This 
research indicates clearly that the effort to develop and gain approval of the 
reengineered business practices as a baseline for determining an IT and 
organizational solution must be a priority effort.38  
By April 1998, the team’s plans to modernize through privatization were 
approved through top-level management in CECOM, AMC, and the Army.  However, 
when their proposal reached the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level and 
OMB, OMB told OSD and the project team that in fact LMP was an outsourcing 
initiative, not a privatization effort, and that they did need to conduct a competition with 
the government employees.  OSD did not appear willing to take on that political battle, 
so the team was stuck with the A-76 process despite their reasoning to the contrary.  
According to Carroll, “At that point, we thought our efforts were finished because we 
knew an A-76 cost comparison was a waste of time in this circumstance.” 
 
Nonetheless, the team still had one remaining option.  OMB representatives had 
mentioned that the Circular allowed for the application of a waiver in special 
circumstances.  Vince Buonocore, the team’s main attorney and Assistant to the Chief 
                                                 
38 LMP Special Project Team, “The Business Case: Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” 
CECOM, US Army, February 12, 2004, p. 34. 
 
Acquisition Research 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY   - 20- 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Council at CECOM, found that their case for a waiver fit OMB’s requirements.  He also 
found that although waivers were permitted under A-76 guidelines, there was in fact no 
precedent for a waiver request.39  Still the team pushed forward—they had nothing to 
lose by trying.  The team officially assembled their case for a waiver, and AMC 
Commander General Johnnie Wilson sent an A-76 waiver package to the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment in October of 1998.  
Wilson signed the waiver request saying, “An elongated A-76 process can take between 
14 months and 24 months to complete…. If we cannot get the waiver approved, then it’s 
really going to set us back.”40  The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, 
Logistics and Environment—ultimately responsible for granting the initial waiver 
according to OMB regulations—approved LMP’s waiver request.  Although OMB had 
published the A-76 Circular, OMB did not have a direct role in the waiver process once 
the team submitted its request.  Thus, it was essential for LMP to have the support from 
top-level management throughout the DoD chain of command. 
 
In anticipation of future resistance, the original waiver package was revised in 
March of 1999 to include a revised business case, an economic analysis, an acquisition 
strategy, a logistics integration agency study, background on private sector supply chain 
achievements, and a risk analysis of the alternatives.41  The memorandum in support of 
the request listed three main reasons for a waiver: (1) the conversion will result in 
significant service quality improvements, (2) the conversion will not serve to reduce 
significantly the level or quality of competition in the future award or performance of 
work, and (3) the functions to be converted are not inherently governmental.42  However, 
                                                 
39 As of March 2004, the members of the LMP project team believe that the LMP waiver request was the 
first and only request of its kind for any executive agency. 
40 Gregory Slabodkin, “Army Seeks A-76 Waiver for Logistics Project,” Government Computer News , 
November 23, 1998. [Accessed on February 2004]  Viewed at 
http://www.gcn.com/archives/gcn/1998/november23/3a.htm. 
41 General Accounting Office, “DoD Competitive Sourcing: Plan Needed to Mitigate Risks in Army 
Logistics Modernization Program,” October 1999, p. 20. 
42 LMP Special Project Team, Memorandum in Support of the Request for Cost Comparison Waiver in 
Connection with the Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program, US Army, p. 1. 
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a waiver request had in fact never been attempted because such a move was expected 
to bring stiff resistance from unions and Congress.  Indeed, the expectations for 
resistance were realized. 
THE BIGGEST HURDLE:  
CONGRESS, UNIONS AND A SOFT-LANDING 
On April 27, 1999, the Army notified Congress and the CDA employees that it 
had approved an A-76 waiver for the LMP project.  In early May, the local union in St. 
Louis that represented many of the St. Louis CDA employees, the National Federation 
of Federal Employees (NFFE), officially filed an appeal with the Army (the 
Chambersburg center employees were not represented by a union).  NFFE claimed the 
government employees should be able to compete for the contract through the 
traditional A-76 process.  Immediately, Congressional representatives from the two 
areas became involved. 
Representative Dick Gephardt, the House Minority Leader, was heavily 
connected with labor unions in Missouri and represented some of the employees at the 
St. Louis CDA. With Gephardt, Representatives Jim Talent and Jerry Costello, 
members whose districts also held the St. Louis CDA employees, demanded to know 
what was happening to their constituents’ jobs. 
Due to the number of government jobs involved, the program was highly charged 
politically, but it was also covering new ground.  As a result, Capelli and Buonocore 
were required to make innumerable trips around Washington to brief and explain to 
many congressional committees, representatives, military departments and even other 
executive agencies what LMP was doing and why.  According to Buonocore, whose 
primary role on the team was to serve as an advocate for the program, helping put 
together the request for the waiver and responding to interested parties in Washington: 
The attitude in the Pentagon often was: ‘Get as many fingerprints on it 
as possible so there is enough blame to be spread around when the political 
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heat comes in.’  A lot of the resistance was due to the unprecedented nature 
of our program.  There really weren’t many substantive program issues to 
deal with.  This just wasn’t the way competitive sourcing was done…and 
people were put off by it because it had never been tried at that time.  We 
had to explain, explain, and explain again.43 
Meanwhile, in March of 1999, the project team had continued to prepare its 
solicitation and evaluation strategy for potential contractors.  Their strategy was not to 
ask competing companies for a business process and software solution, but to ask for 
an approach to find the solution.  To facilitate this process, the team used a commercial 
business practice called “due diligence,” a risk management tool often used prior to 
corporate acquisitions.44  In their case, the LMP team defined “due diligence” as “a 
period of time wherein offerors shall be allowed to examine the organizations and 
operations associated with the WLMP. This period will allow offerors to asses the 
program’s needs in order to mitigate proposal risks.”45 This included site visits and 
access to an Internet-based virtual library. 
The team then focused on each company’s risk assessment of the contractors’ 
proposed approaches to finding a business process and software solution.  With their 
responsibility to take care of CDA employees in mind, the team wanted to make the 
contract a win-win for both the government and the private vendor.  Their Request for 
Proposal (RFP) required all offerors to put a minimum soft-landing requirement in the 
contract, stating that the contract must offer at least a one-year job guarantee to all CDA 
employees, at the current geographical location, with comparable pay and benefits.    
Additionally, one of their evaluation criteria was “What are you going to do to get a hold 
of the expertise you need to sustain our legacy systems—which we are going to transfer 
                                                 
43 Vince Buonocore, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
44 For more information about LMP’s use of the Due Diligence process, see: Lea Duerinck, “Use of Due 
Diligence in the Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” Program Manager, July/August 2000. 
45 Lea Duerinck, “Use of Due Diligence in the Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” Program 
Manager, July/August 2000, p. 61. 
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to you at the time of award—until modernization is complete?”46  The team asked how 
each company was going to mitigate the risk of losing legacy expertise until the 
transition was completed knowing well that the only logical solution for the contractors to 
mitigate the risk was to hire the current CDA employees.   
Said Carroll: “The only place the offerors could get the expertise to run the legacy 
systems was from the CDA employees, so the employees became valuable assets to 
win the contract and to achieve future performance bonuses…We were able to take this 
to Congress, leaders in DoD and the employees and say, ‘yes, taking care of our people 
is a top priority.’” 
In addition to the due diligence process, the team employed other methods of 
commercial acquisition practice that were allowed by the recent revisions to the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act.47  Most notably, the team conducted communications with the 
offerors prior to establishing the competitive range.  The team provided each offeror 
Initial, Interim and Final Evaluation Reports that listed their strengths, weaknesses and 
deficiencies.48  These periodic reports let the offerors know exactly where they stood 
throughout the evaluation process.  As a result, the contractors knew what specific 
points in their offer to improve, and the proposals continually got better.  For instance, in 
the end, the winning contractor offered a three-year soft-landing—two years beyond the 
team’s minimum requirement. 
As the process went along, LMP received a lot of high level interest from within 
DoD due to the innovative methods that were being introduced.  In fact, in terms of the 
soft-landing, it was the first ever in DoD history.49  LMP enjoyed the support of many key 
                                                 
46 Thomas Carroll, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
47 The most recent section of Federal Acquisition Reform Act to be rewritten is Section 15, “Contracting by 
Negotiation,” which was used specifically by the LMP team. 
48 Paul Capelli and John Keogh, “Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” LMP, US Army, p. 4. 
49 Nancy Ferris, “Logistics Logjam,” Government Executive, May 1, 1999. [Accessed on February 2004]  
Viewed at http://www.govexec.com. 
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leaders such as the Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, and Undersecretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Dr. Jacques Gansler. 
 
”I really supported the Army’s Logistics Modernization Program.  In the end 
it demonstrated that with good planning you can arrive at a win-win 
situation…the Army acquired a state of the art, COTS based logistics 
management system, while the soft landing program protected the 
displaced employees.” Dr. Jacques S. Gansler 
 
In addition to their trips to the Pentagon, Capelli and Buonocore estimate that 
they delivered about 20 briefings on the Hill.  Of those trips, only two were to House 
member Bud Shuster who represented the Chambersburg employees.  Once they 
explained the substantive reasoning for LMP, and explained the soft-landing provision 
they were requiring of the winning contractor, Rep. Shuster and his staff understood 
what the LMP program was trying to accomplish.  
The experience was different with the St. Louis representatives because the 
union involvement was providing a source of greater resistance.  Capelli and Buonocore 
made many trips to brief these representatives with the same presentation.  
Interestingly, after Capelli and Buonocore had explained the soft landing provision that 
they were requiring   to the staffers of Rep. Gephardt, one of the most prominent union 
supporters in Congress, most of the staffers reacted positively to the plans, and 
repeatedly asked: “Gee, it all sounds good—so tell us again why the union doesn’t like 
it?”  Says Buonocore, “Was the local union stoking the fires in St. Louis?  Yes, no 
question, because there weren’t really many objections with the substance and 
reasoning for the program.”50 
                                                 
50 Vince Buonocore, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
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LMP did have lobbyists in their corner as well—among them, the Information 
Technology Association of America and the Professional Services Council.  Ultimately, 
Capelli said the scales in Congress tipped in their favor because “of the sanity of what 
we were tasked to do. We had to modernize. It made sense to outsource. The money 
was right and just as importantly we had devised a plan to take care of the Government 
employees that were being outsourced.”51  
Capelli and Buonocore tried other mollifying measures with NFFE when things 
continued to stagnate. They had visited the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis 
where, in the face of a nationwide wave of base closures, the Navy had conducted a 
privatization effort to place the operation of the center under private control.52  In this 
case, the Navy and the winning contractor conciliated the union representing the public 
employees by allowing the employees to remain unionized even after the public-to-
private transition took place.  They had specifically asked the local NFFE president, 
John Morris, whether a similar approach could work in St. Louis, but Morris ultimately 
responded that such a move went against NFFE’s national charter, and was therefore 
not a possibility. 
When NFFE maintained that the Army wouldn’t negotiate or communicate, 
Capelli and the LMP team “took great pains” to keep the union informed and extended 
opportunities to NFFE to share any input they may have had on implementation and 
impact proposals.53  Buonocore says the team never received a response from the 
union in this regard because the union was caught in a catch-22 situation.  On one 
hand, the union wanted to preserve their stance that the agency wasn’t negotiating.  On 
the other hand, if the union gave any advice or proposals, they were facilitating the 
same process that they were trying to stop. 
                                                 
51 Paul Capelli, email response to questions, May 14, 2004 
52 Jacques Gansler, Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of Government as 
the Provider, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise and the IBM Endowment for the Business of 
Government, June 2003, p. 29. 
53 Vince Buonocore, LMP Attorney, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly and Keith 
Snider.  Moorestown, New Jersey, March 11, 2004. 
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Army Secretary Louis Caldera, responsible for the final appeal decision, rejected 
the union appeal and sustained the initial decision in a September 30, 1999 
memorandum, stating: “The OMB Circular A-76 process is intended to apply to recurring 
commercial activities.  The Circular is not intended to constrain federal agencies in the 
adoption of better business management practices or the termination of obsolete 
services…Accordingly, I deny all of the appeals on the wholly independent ground that 
the A-76 process is not applicable.”54 
                                                 
54 Brian Friel, “Army Outsourcing Plan Leads to Employee Exodus,” Government Executive, October 18, 
1999. [Accessed on March 2004]Viewed at http://www.govexec.com. 
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CONCLUSION 
When all else had failed, in early December NFFE went to the U.S. District Court 
of the Eastern District of Missouri looking for a restraining order and an injunction. The 
correspondence from the team to the union, which clearly requested and welcomed the 
union’s help served to repudiate the union’s claim that the Army and the LMP Program 
were not negotiating.  Also, the business case and the myriad of appeal analyses 
stating why the cost comparison did not make sense in LMP’s case were enough to 
rebut the union’s charge that the process for decision-making was arbitrary and unfair. 
The final legal appeal was unsuccessful, and on December 30, 1999, AMC awarded the 
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) with a 10-year contract—the ten year contract 
was required so that CSC could recoup the loss during the development phase while 
they were also maintaining the legacy system and operating at a loss.  
Ultimately, AMC chose CSC because: (1) their performance bonus plan was 
more aggressive—they were willing to put a greater percentage of their revenues 
contingent on their performance, and the team believed this minimized the Army’s risk; 
and (2) their soft landing plan was better for employees. CSC guaranteed every 
employee a three-year job guarantee in the same geographic location, comparable pay 
and benefits, and a $15,000 bonus with the first CSC paycheck. 
Addressing the final soft-landing package extended to the CDA employees by 
CSC, Capelli said: 
Throughout the entire process leading up to award, never once was 
the ‘soft-landing’ taken off the table. Everyone, from each member of my 
team, to Commanding Generals at all levels, to Congressmen and Senators, 
took this aspect of the program very seriously. All were adamant that our 
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displaced employees get a fair shake for ensuring the readiness of our 
soldiers. We think the package extended by CSC is an excellent one.55 
In the end, job offers were extended to all remaining 207 employees, with 205 
accepting.56  Originally, there were almost 500 total employees at both centers.  Most 
CDA employees, however, were participants in the legacy Civil Service Retirement 
System, and 83% were eligible for regular or early retirement within five years of 1999. 57 
Consequently, many employees chose to transfer to other federal positions or accept 
buyouts and early retirement packages offered by the Army. 58   
Capelli and his team were satisfied that they had successfully completed their 
difficult task with an innovative solution.  For Capelli, the LMP would “provide a single 
wholesale logistics system59 that will be capable of providing timely, flexible and cost-
effective world wide distribution of assets that can sustain integrated, joint and 
multinational military and peacetime operations…From a logistics standpoint, the LMP 
is on the cutting edge of everything the Army wants to become…LMP will forward the 
march in the revolution in business affairs and resultant revolution in military logistics.”60 
                                                 
55 Paul Capelli, email response to questions, May 14, 2004 
56 Computer Sciences Corporation, “Logistics Modernization Program Transition.” [Accessed on April 
2004]  Viewed at http://www.csc.com/industries/government/casestudies/1346.shtml. 
57 General Accounting Office, “DoD Competitive Sourcing: Plan Needed to Mitigate Risks in Army 
Logistics Modernization Program,” October 1999, p. 17. 
58 Larry Asch, LMP Chief, LMP Business Office, US Army.  Interviewed by William Lucyshyn, Robert Maly 
and Keith Snider.  College Park, Maryland, January 29, 2004. 
59 NOTE: the retail portion is under the Global Combat Support System-Army 
60 Paul Capelli and John Keogh, “Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program,” LMP, US Army, p. 5. 
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APPENDIX B 
Terms and Abbreviations 
AMC  Army Materiel Command 
BPR  Business Process Reengineering 
BRAC  Base Realignment and Closure 
CCSS  Commodity Command Standard System 
CECOM Communications-Electronics Command 
CDA  Central Design Activity 
CIO  Chief Information Officer 
COTS  Commercial off-the-shelf 
CSC  Computer Sciences Corporation 
COBOL Common Business Oriented Language 
DoD  Department of Defense 
GAO  General Accounting Office 
GCSS  Global Combat Support System 
IT  Information Technology 
LMP  Logistics Modernization Program (or WLMP, or LOGMOD) 
LOGMOD Logistics Modernization Program (or WLMP, or LMP) 
MEO  Most Efficient Organization 
NFFE  National Federation of Federal Employees 
OMB  Office of Management and Budget 
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense 
SDS  Standard Depot System 
WLMP Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program (or LMP, or LOGMOD)  
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